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This article focuses on a package of model treaties on international
criminal cooperation that were approved at the Seventh and Eighth
United Nations Congresses on the Prevention of Crime and the Treat-
ment of Offenders, in 1985 and 1990.1 These models represent an at-
tempt to capture the state of the art in international cooperative prac-
tice. The model treaties in question are: Model Agreement on the
Transfer of Foreign Prisoners,2 Model Treaty on Extradition, 3 Model
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,4 Model Treaty on
the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters,5 Model Treaty on the
Transfer of Supervision of Offenders Conditionally Sentenced or Con-
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Member, United Nations Committee on Crime Prevention and Control (1986-1990);
B.A., LL.M. (Victoria U. of Wellington, New Zealand), LL.M., J.S.D. (Columbia).
This article is based on a paper delivered by Professor Clark at the Ninth Common-
wealth Law Conference, Auckland, New Zealand, Apr. 17-20, 1990. The author is
currently engaged in a broader study of the work of the United Nations in the criminal
justice area with the aid of an Andrei Sakharov Fellowship from the Jacob Blaustein
Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights.
1. The United Nations Congresses, held by the United Nations every five years
beginning in 1955, bring together specialists in penal law and administration, both gov-
ernmental and non-governmental, from most countries of the world to share common
experiences and to formulate standards. The tradition of holding Congresses of this
nature goes back to the 1870s. See generally B. ALPER & J. BOREN, CRIME: INTERNA-
TiONAL AGENDA (1972); L. RADZINOWICZ, International Collaboration in Criminal
Science in THE MODERN APPROACH TO CRIMINAL LAW 467 (L. Radzinowicz & J.
Turner eds. 1945); Clark, The Eighth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
Treatment of Offenders, 1 CRiM. L.F. 513 (1990).
2. Report of the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders,U.N.Doc.A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1 at 53 (1986) [here-
inafter Model Prisoner Transfer Agreement].
3. Report of the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28 (1990) at 71 [hereinaf-
ter Model Extradition Treaty].
4. Id. at 82 [hereinafter Model Mutual Assistance Treaty].
5. Id. at 96 [hereinafter Model Transfer of Proceedings Treaty].
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ditionally Released," and Model Treaty for the Prevention of Crimes
that Infringe on the Cultural Heritage of Peoples in the Form of Mova-
ble Property.7
I shall endeavor both to analyze the documents themselves and to
place them in legal and historical context.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE MODELS
In the simpler world of the nineteenth century, most of the impe-
tus for encouraging transnational cooperation in criminal matters was
generated by fleeing thieves and murderers. The basic response was the
development of a network of bilateral extradition treaties which pro-
vided the means for the return of fugitives to justice.8 Few countries
were ever entirely systematic in their pattern of treaties and there were
always relatively safe havens left in the cracks. Many former colonial
territories, moreover - including some developed ones like my own,
New Zealand - never got around after independence to negotiating
more than a handful of their own treaties. For the most part, they have
relied on treaty succession to the treaties of the former metropolitan
power. If my unscientific examination of the literature is any guide, the
most interesting issue in extradition for decades was the political of-
fender exception, a dash of human rights in an otherwise law and order
structure, normally written into at least those treaties between states
with a Western European political tradition.'
Along with the invention of the multilateral treaty in the nine-
teenth century, however, came a gradual realization that there were
some societal ills that were of international concern and should be dealt
with in part by the criminal law on a transnational and multilateral
6. Id. at 103 [hereinafter Model Transfer of Supervision Treaty].
7. Id. at 110 [hereinafter Model Cultural Heritage Treaty].
8. Within the British Empire, rendition of the likes of thievs and murderers
between parts of that entity was facilitated by Imperial legislation. The modern Com-
monwealth has its successor to that in the "Scheme" initiated in 19615 and amended in
1983 and 1986. The basic approach of the Scheme (which is not a treaty) is the adop-
tion by most members of the Commonwealth of what amounts to parallel legislation
permitting return of fugitives under circumstances where extradition would be appro-
priate between two non-Commonwealth countries or between a Commonwealth country
and a non-Commonwealth country. See Commonwealth Scheme for the Rendition of
Fugitive Offenders, as amended in, 16 COMMONWEALTH LAW BULL. 1036 (1990). The
actual workings of the scheme are similar to a network of bilateral treaties.
9. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION 72 (1980).
[Vol. 15
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basis. 10 Early examples were the slave trade,"- the trade in women and
children,' 2 trade in obscene publications,13 forgery of currency 4 and
trade in illicit drugs.1 5 These have continued to be of some moment,
but they were joined - as the twentieth century progressed and the
United Nations came into existence - by perhaps more politically
charged items such as genocide, 16 war crimes,17 apartheid,18 and vari-
ous terrorist offenses (like aircraft hijacking,' attacks on diplomats,20
the taking of hostages21 and torture22).
10. For a comprehensive list of multilateral criminal law treaties, see M. BAS-
sIouNI, A DRAFt INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 355 (1987) (published in this Symposium).
11. See, e.g., Declaration Relative to the Universal Abolition of the Slave Trade,
Feb. 8, 1815, 2 Martens Nouveau Recueil de Traites 432; Slavery Convention, Sept.
25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery,
Sept. 7, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 3.
12. See, e.g., International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave
Traffic, Mar. 18, 1904, 1 L.N.T.S. 83; International Convention for the Suppression of
the Traffic in Women and Children, opened for signature Sept. 30, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S.
415; Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of
the Prostitution of Others, May 4, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 271.
13. See, e.g., Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene Pub-
lications, May 4, 1910, 7 Martens Nouveau Recueil de Traites (ser.3) 266; Interna-
tional Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation of and Traffic in Obscene
Publications, Sept. 12, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 169.
14. See International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Cur-
rency, Apr. 20, 1929, 112 L.N.T.S. 371.
15. See, e.g., International Opium Convention, Jan. 23, 1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187;
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 151; United Na-
tions Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/15 (1988).
16. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
G.A. Res. 260 (III)A, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
17. Geneva Conventions of 1949.
18. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N.
Doec. A/9030 (1973).
19. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 133 (1971); Convention for the Suppression of Un-
lawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 10 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1151 (1971).
20. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment'of Crimes Against Interna-
tionally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, G.A. Res. 3166 (XXVIII), 28
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 146, U.N. Doec. A/9030 (1973).
21. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146,
34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
Clark
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Each of such activities became the subject of international efforts
at control, centered on one or more multilateral treaties which typically
require parties to the treaty to criminalize the activity and make an
effort to prosecute - or to extradite to someone else who will prosecute
- those who engage in it. The current fuel encouraging international
cooperation is thus abhorrence of the egregious violator of basic rights,
the terrorist, the drug cartel and organized crime in general. These ar-
eas are not, however, in all respects different from traditional crime
and there is, in fact, much cross-fertilization going on. More coopera-
tion in dealing with traditional problems is worth some effort too. In
the long run, cooperation in fighting traditional crime may be of more
practical note than attempts to deal with the obviously 'trendy topics.
In any event, the multilateral treaties commonly proceed with
some fairly standard variations within the arsenal of international coop-
eration. 23 Some of them try to facilitate extradition by adding the of-
fense in question to the list of extraditable offenses contained in ex-
isting bilateral treaties, or by providing that the multilateral treaty
itself may be regarded as sufficient basis for extradition, even in the
absence of another treaty. Making such an offense "ext:raditable" still
leaves the political offender issue up in the air. In some cases, such as
the Genocide24 and Apartheid25 Conventions, the treaty simply denies
that political offender status may ever attach to the person charged
with a treaty offense. In other cases, such as the Hijacking and Of-
fenses Against Aircraft Conventions, a state may take the position that
the accused is a political offender, but must nonetheless bring the case
before its prosecutorial authorities with a view to bringing the accused
to trial.2 6
The regional European Convention for the Suppression of Terror-
ism217 assimilates some of the broader multilateral terrorism treaties
with the Genocide and Apartheid models as between the parties to the
22. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (1984).
23. I have expanded upon this in Clark, Offenses of International Concern Mul-
tilateral State Treaty Practice in the Forty Years Since Nurembf'rg, 57 NoRwic J.
INT'L L. 49 (1988).
24. Convention on Genocide, supra note 16, at art. VII.
25. Convention on Apartheid, supra note 18, at art. XI.
26. See Clark, supra note 23, at 66-67.
27. Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, Nov. 10, 1976, Europ. T.S. No.
[Vol. 15
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regional convention. It provides that for the purpose of extradition be-
tween its contracting states an offense within the scope of the Hague
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 2 and
an offense within the scope of the Montreal Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation29 shall
not be regarded as a political offense or as an offense inspired by politi-
cal motives.3 0
Such treaties respond to the absence of an international penal tri-
bunal by treating nation states as the agents by necessity of the inter-
national system. They thus encourage the exercise of jurisdiction on
theoretical bases which have always seemed a little esoteric to the com-
mon law mind - such as the nationality of the accused, the nationality
of the victim (so-called "passive personality" jurisdiction) and universal
jurisdiction.3 1
Rather plainly, though, the multilateral treaties have not ad-
dressed all of the relevant problems of international cooperation. What
is more, they rely for their efficacy on the network of bilateral relations
already mentioned, since they in effect incorporate those relationships
by reference. This has led to efforts both to modernize the bilaterals3 2
(not only as to extradition but also as to areas of cooperation beyond
that) and to encourage states that do not have a serious network of
bilaterals to enter into negotiations with others. This is indeed the role
of the models adopted in 1985 and 1990. It has been taken as a given
that a massive global treaty tying together all the loose ends is simply
not about to happen. Thus, painstaking work must be done by individ-
ual countries to put the pieces together mostly on a bilateral basis,33
28. Convention on Aircraft, supra note 19.
29. Convention on Aviation, supra note 19.
30. Convention on Terrorism, supra note 27, at art. 1 (which also denies political
offense status to various acts constituting offenses against internationally protected per-
sons, kidnapping and the taking of hostages and various acts involving a danger to the
public).
31. Clark, supra note 23, at 85-86.
32. On the strategy of United States' modernization efforts, see Nadelman, The
Role of the United States in the International Enforcement of Criminal Law, 31
HARv. INT'L L.J. 37, 64 (1990).
33. Note the trenchant comment by Nadelman, supra note 32, at 65: "Multilat-
eral arrangements suffer from their tendency to settle on the lowest common denomina-
tor of cooperation. Bilateral treaties, on the other hand, afford the opportunity to push
the negotiating partner to include those provisions of greatest interest and advantage to
the United States." It is, of course, not only the United States that may seek such
advantages - mutual ones even! A very good discussion of the practical and cultural
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although some further regional developments might be expected. 4 For-
eign offices and justice departments, especially those in developing
countries and even small developed ones, simply do not have the re-
sources to re-invent the wheel each time they enter into negotiations.
Hence, it was deemed helpful to have some widely accepted models to
which to turn - a kind of international form book.
This enterprise represents a new departure for the United Nations.
The organization has had a great deal of experience with the drafting
of other kinds of "instruments" - multilateral treaties such as the
Covenants on Human Rights, 35 and resolutions of a softer legal nature
which contribute to the development of international custom, such as
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 6 and the Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.3" But the present docu-
ments are instruments of a different juridical nature. They represent a
benchmark to follow but anticipate that states will almost certainly
make some variations as they tailor-make the contents to their own
needs and legal structure.38
problems encountered by negotiators in the area, especially those dealing across differ-
ent legal systems is contained in Eser, Common Goals and Different Ways in Interna-
tional Criminal Law: Reflections from a European Perspective, 31 :-IARV. INT'L LJ
117 (1990).
34. Thus, the models are all drafted primarily in language that assumes the
treaty to be a bilateral one, but occasionally there are lapses where the language reads
more like that of a multilateral. Not much tidying up is required to utilize the models
in either mode.
35. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200 (XXI)A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, id. at 52.
36. International Bill of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, 3(1) U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
37. ECOSOC Res. 663 (XXIV) C, 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No.1) at 11, U.N.
Doc. E/3048 (1957).
38. On earlier efforts by the International Penal and Prison Commission (as it
then was) to develop a model extradition treaty, see Radzinowicz, supra note 1, at 478-
79 n.2. The technique of drafting model agreements to deal with developing areas of
the law is not unknown in domestic legal practice. For a recent example, see American
Bar Association, The Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchang,; - A Report and
Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 Bus. LAw. 1645 (1990). The United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law is considering whether it might be possible to
produce a model electronic data interchange agreement with global possibilities in the
commercial community. Report of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.17) at 9-10, U.N. Doc. A/45/17 (1990). The
work in the United States of the Uniform Law Commissioners is alko analogous. See
[Vol. 15
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II. THE MODEL TREATIES
1. The Model Agreement on the Transfer of Foreign Prisoners
The first of the model treaties was the lone one adopted in 1985,
the Model Agreement on the Transfer of Foreign Prisoners. 9 Its ratio-
nales are stated rather succinctly in two preambular paragraphs of the
adopting resolution which has the Congress "[r]ecognizing the difficul-
ties of foreigners detained in prison establishments abroad owing to
such factors as differences in language, culture, customs and religion,"
and "[c]onsidering that the aim of social resettlement of offenders
could best be achieved by giving foreign prisoners the opportunity to
serve their sentence within their country of nationality or residence. '40
generally Leflar, Minimizing State Conflicts of Law, 4 DET. C.L. REv. 1325 (1983);
Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(1979).
39. Model Prisoner Transfer Agreement, supra note 2. The written legislative
history of this and the other model treaties is rather thin. The United Nations does not
make either verbatim or summary records of these planning sessions. At best there are
rapporteurial or secretariat accounts of the debates together with what can be gleaned
by considering successive drafts and any explanatory notes thereon. There is some use-
ful material in the Note by the Secretariat prepared for the Seventh Congress under
the title Model Agreement on the Transfer of Foreign Prisoners and Recommendations
for the Treatment of Foreign Prisoners, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 121/10 (1985). The first
U.S. treaties were those with Mexico and Canada in 1976 and 1977 respectively. See
Note, Criminal Law: Exchange of Prisoners, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 703 (1977). For
debate on the advisability and constitutionality of the exercise in the American context,
see Abramovsky & Eagle, A Critical Evaluation of the Mexican-American Transfer of
Penal Sanctions Treaty, 64 IowA L. REv. 275 (1979); Vagts, A Reply to 'A Critical
Evaluation of the Mexican-American Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaty, id. at 325;
Stotzky & Swan, Due Process Methodology and Prisoner Exchange Treaties: Con-
fronting an Uncertain Calculus," 62 MiNN. L. Rnv. 733 (1978). Prisoner transfers
have been most developed in European practice. The first example was apparently the
Convention Regarding the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Criminal
Matters, Mar. 8, 1948, Denmark-Norway-Sweden, 27 U.N.T.S. 117. See also Euro-
pean Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, May 28, 1970,
Europ. T.S. No. 70; DeSchutter, International Criminal Cooperation - the Benelux
Example, in 2 A TanATIsE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMNAL LAW 249 (M. Bassiouni &
V. Nanda eds. 1973).
40. Model Prisoner Transfer Agreement, supra note 2, Preamble (paras. 2-3).
This is the idealistic rationale for such treaties, and sometimes the real explanation. Cf.
the following, concerning the first two transfer treaties negotiated by the United States:
The Canadian treaty appears genuinely intended to aid prisoner rehabilita-
tion, parolee supervision, and law enforcement cooperation between the
two countries. The Mexican treaty, however, is principally a response to
7
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The model treaty itself begins with a set of "general principles."
The desirability of fostering "social resettlement" is again stressed.41 A
transfer should be effected on the basis of mutual respect for national
sovereignty and jurisdiction.42 There must be double criminality: a
transfer should be effected in cases where the offense giving rise to con-
viction is punishable by deprivation of liberty by the judicial authority
of both the "sending" (or "sentencing") state and the state to which
the transfer is to be effected (the "administering state") according to
their national laws.43 A transfer may be requested either by the sen-
tencing or the administering state. The prisoner, as well as close rela-
tives, may express to either state an interest in the transfer. To that
end, the states in question must inform the prisoner of their competent
authorities.44 A transfer shall be dependent on the agreement of both
the sentencing and the administering state, and shall also be based on
the consent of the prisoner.45 The prisoner must be fully informed of
the possibility and of the legal consequences of the transfer, in particu-
lar whether or not he or she might be prosecuted for other offenses
committed before the transfer.46 Moreover, the administering state
should be given the opportunity to verify the free consent of the pris-
,oner.47 In cases where the prisoner is incapable of making a free deter-
both popular and congressional concern with allegations that Americans in
Mexican jails were subject to intolerable living conditions, acts of brutal-
ity, and extortion by prison officials and fellow prisoners.
Stotzky & Swan, supra note 39, at 736.
41. Model Prisoner Transfer Agreement, supra note 2, at para. 1.
42. Id. at para. 2.
43. Id. at para. 3.
44. Id. at para. 4.
45. Id. at para. 5. As the Secretary-General explains in his Note, id. at paras. 4-
5:
[T]he requirement that prisoners must consent to the transfer ensures that
transfers are not used as a method of expelling prisoners, or as a means of
disguised extradition. Moreover, since prison conditions vary considerably
from country to country, and the prisoner may have very personal reasons
for not wishing to be transferred, it seems preferable to base the proposed
model agreement on the consent requirement.
The issue has been joined on whether "consent" is "freely" given or refused when it
takes place in the face of intolerable prison conditions. See Abramovsky & Eagle,
supra note 39; Vagts, supra note 39; Stotzky & Swan, supra note 39; Abramovsky, A
Critical Evaluation of the American Transfer of Penal Sanctions Policy, Wisc. L.
Rnv., Jan.-Feb. 1980, at 25.
46. Model Prisoner Transfer Agreement, supra note 2, at para. 6.
47. Id. at para. 7.
[Vol. 15
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mination, that person's legal representative is competent to consent to
the transfer.48
As a general rule, at the time of the request for a transfer the
prisoner must still have to serve at least six months of the sentence;
however, a transfer should also be granted in cases of indeterminate
sentences. 9 One provision is in the pious hope category: The decision
whether to transfer a prisoner shall be taken without delay.50 The
model treaty also contains a double jeopardy provision. A person trans-
ferred may not be tried again in the administering state for the same
act on which the sentence to be executed is based.51
There follow a number of what the model describes as "procedural
regulations." A rather basic proposition is that a transfer shall in no
case lead to an aggravation of the situation of the prisoner.5 2 The ex-
tent to which the prisoner may be better off (aside from the benefit of
returning to his or her own country) is complex. When the transfer
occurs, the authorities of the administering state must (a) continue the
enforcement of the sentence immediately or through a court or admin-
istrative order; or (b) convert the sentence, thereby substituting for the
sanction imposed in the sentencing state a sanction prescribed by the
law of the administering state for a corresponding offense.5 In the case
of continuing enforcement, the administering state is bound by the le-
gal nature and duration of the sentence as determined by the sentenc-
ing state. However, if this sentence is by its nature or duration incom-
patible with the law of the administering state, this state may adapt the
sanction to the punishment or measure prescribed by its own law for a
corresponding offense.5
In the case of conversion of sentence, the administering state shall
be entitled to adapt the sanction as to its nature or duration according
to its national law, taking into due consideration the sentence passed in
48. Id. at para. 9.
49. Id. at para. 11.
50. Id. at para. 12.
51. Id. at para. 13. Principles of double jeopardy are quite undeveloped at the
international level. This and other models represent tentative efforts to move in the
direction of exploring the matter further. For some tentative efforts to raise the issue,
see International Law Commission, Fifth Report on the Draft Code of Offences
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/404 (1987), at 5-6,
12 (Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur).
52. Model Prisoner Transfer Agreement, supra note 2, at para. 19.
53. Id. at para. 14.
54. Id. at para. 15.
1991]
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the sentencing state. However, a sanction involving the deprivation of
liberty shall not be converted to a pecuniary sanction.55 The adminis-
tering state is bound by the findings as to the facts in so far as they
appear from the judgement imposed in the sentencing state. Thus, the
sentencing state has the sole competence for a review of the sentence.5 6
The period of deprivation of liberty already served by the sentenced
person in either state shall be fully deducted from the final sentence.57
A final "procedural regulation" deals with costs. Any costs in-
curred because of a transfer and related to transportation shall be
borne by the administering state, unless otherwise decided by both the
sentencing and administering states.58 Two brief paragraphs deal with
what is described as "enforcement and pardon." One asserts that the
enforcement of the sentence shall be governed by the law of the ad-
ministering state.59 The other confirms that both the sentencing and the
administering state shall be competent to grant pardon and amnesty.6"
As adopted by the Seventh Congress, the model was accompanied
by a set of nine recommendations of an essentially human rights and
humanitarian nature on the treatment of foreign prisoners.6' These rec-
ommendations insist that foreign prisoners must be treated in a non-
discriminatory fashion. They must also be informed without delay of
their right to request contacts with their consular authorities, as well as
of any other relevant information regarding their status. Contacts of
foreign prisoners with families and community agencies should be facil-
itated, by providing the necessary opportunities for visits and corre-
spondence, with the consent of the prisoner. Humanitarian interna-
tional organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross, should be given the opportunity to assist foreign prisoners. The
recommendations were formulated taking into account that among the
foremost measures for alleviating the problems of foreign prisoners -
including those whose transfer cannot be effected - is the provision of
55. Id. at para. 16.
56. Id. at para. 17. Few states are likely to agree to treaties that permit the
administering state's courts to review the original decision on the merits. See generally
Vagts, supra note 39.
57. Model Prisoner Transfer Agreement, supra note 2, at para. 18.
58. Id. at para. 20. Presumably other costs - notably the cost of imprisonment in
the administering state - lie where they fall.
59. Id. at para. 21.
60. Id. at para. 22.
61. Report of the Seventh United Nations Congress, supra note 2 at 57, Annex
[Vol. 15
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information and contacts, including information in their own
languages. 2
2. The Model Treaty on Extradition
The Model Treaty on Extradition" follows a fairly standard mod-
em format, based to a substantial degree as a drafting matter on recent
Australian extradition treaties." The parties would agree to extradite
to each other, upon request and subject to the terms of the treaty, a
person who is wanted in the requesting state for prosecution for an ex-
traditable offense or for the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in
respect of such an offense. 5 Extraditable offenses are defined, as is now
usual, not by a list of specific offenses, but by severity of penalty:
[E]xtraditable offences are offences that are punishable under the
laws of both Parties by imprisonment or other deprivation of lib-
erty for a maximum period of at least [one/two] year(s), or by a
more severe penalty. Where the request for extradition relates to a
person who is wanted for the enforcement of a sentence of impris-
onment or other deprivation of liberty imposed for such an offence,
extradition shall be granted only if a period of at least [four/six]
months of such sentence remains to be served. 8
(The bracketed numbers reflect some disagreement about the appropri-
ate parameters). The model contains both mandatory and optional
grounds for refusing extradition.
Extradition will be refused if the offense for which extradition is
requested is regarded by the requested state as an offense of a political
62. U.N. Doc, supra note 39 at 8 (Note by the Secretariat).
63. Model Extradition Treaty, supra note 3.
64. Australia has in recent years been unusually aggressive in tidying up its in-
ventory of extradition treaties. It has brought new treaties into force with Argentina,
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Iceland, Ire-
land, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain
and Sweden. As of April 3, 1990, further treaties were awaiting ratification with Ecua-
dor, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Monaco, the Philippines,
Switzerland, Uruguay and Venezuela. Letter from Herman F. Woltring (Attorney
General's Department, Canberra, A.C.T., Australia) to Roger S. Clark (Apr. 18,
1990); see also Woltring, Extradition Law, 61 VICTORIAN L. INST. J. 919 (1987).
65. Model Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 1.
66. Id. at art. 2, para. 1.
1991]
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nature.17 However, a bracketed variation on this is included which
provides:
Reference to an offence of a political nature shall not include any
offence in respect of which the Parties have assumed an obligation,
pursuant to any multilateral convention, to take prosecutorial ac-
tion where they do not extradite, nor any other offence agreed by
the Parties not to be an offence of a political character for the pur-
poses of extradition. 68
The effect of the first part of this variant is functionally the same as the
approach taken in the European Convention on the Suppression of Ter-
rorism.69 Essentially, the parties would agree that the extradite-or-
prosecute obligation in treaties such as the Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages70 or the aircraft conventions 71 would be treated as
an absolute obligation between those parties to extradite. The latter
part of the bracketed material is probably redundant. It confirms the
obligation of parties to the Genocide and Apartheid Conventions 72 not
to treat the offenses contained therein as political.7
Extradition will also be refused if the requested state has substan-
tial grounds for believing that the request for extradition has been
made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account
of that person's race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opin-
ions, sex or status, or that the person's position may be prejudiced for
any of those reasons. 4 Similarly, it will be refused if the person whose
extradition is requested has been or could be subjected in the request-
67. Id. at art. 3(a).
68. Id.
69. Convention on Terrorism, supra note 27.
70. International Convention, supra note 21.
71. Convention on Aircraft, supra note 19.
72. Genocide, supra note 16; Apartheid, supra note 18.
73. Modern practice in the international crime area seeks, as has been noted
above, to deal with the "safe haven" problem in two over-lapping ways. Sometimes it
encourages prosecution through extradition by denying political offender status to ac-
tivities such as some varieties of terrorism; sometimes it permits a denial of extradition
on a ground such as political offender status, but nonetheless compels prosecution in
the state denying extradition. The nod in the model treaty goes towards extradition
rather than prosecution.
74. Model Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 3 (b). Language to this effect
first appeared in the 1976 European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism,
supra note 27. There is perhaps something of a trend in multilateral practice for such a
provision to replace the political offender exception as the latter is whittled away.
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ing state to torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment, or if that person has not received or would not receive the
minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings, as contained in the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.7 5 Extradition will also
be refused if the offense for which extradition is requested is an offense
under military law, which is not also an offense under ordinary crimi-
nal law; 70 if there has been a final judgment rendered against the per-
son in the requested state in respect of the offense for which extradition
is requested;7 7 or if the person whose extradition is sought has, under
the law of either party, become immune from prosecution or punish-
ment for any reason, including lapse of time or amnesty.78
Finally, extradition will be refused if the judgment of the request-
ing state has been rendered in absentia, the convicted person has not
had sufficient notice of the trial nor the opportunity to arrange his or
her defense, and has not had or will not have the opportunity to have
the case retried in his or her presence. 9
A footnote on grounds for refusal coyly adds what is probably the
nub of the matter for some: "Some countries may wish to add. . . the
following ground for refusal: 'If there is insufficient proof, according to
the evidentiary standards of the Requested State, that the person whose
extradition is requested is a party to the offence.' "80 There are two
significant issues raised here: whether there should be a proof threshold
at all and whether the requested state should defer to the evidentiary
rules of the requesting state. Both are controversial and raise awkward
questions about the extent to which one legal system should trust the
quality of decision-making in the legal system of a treaty partner.
Extradition may be refused if the person whose extradition is re-
75. Model Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 3(0.
76. Id. at art. 3(c).
77. Id. at art. 3(d).
78. Id. at art. 3(e).
79. Id. at art. 3(g).
80. Id. at art. 5 n. 61. Cf. The Commonwealth debate about deleting the prima
facie case requirement from the Commonwealth Scheme; see, e.g., Commonwealth
Secretariat, Meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers, Zimbabwe, Jul. 26 - Aug. 1,
1986, Secretariat Doc.LMM (86) 5 (Memorandum by the Commonwealth Secretariat
and the Government of Australia); see also Woltring, supra note 64, at 920; Kennedy,
Stein & Rubin, The Extradition of Mohammed Hamadei, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 5, 17-
18 (1990); Gilmore, International Action Against Drug Trafficking: Trends in United
Kingdom Law and Practice, 24 INT'L LAW. 365, 371-72 (1990).
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quested is a national of the requested state.81 In the past it has been the
case that, where extradition is refused on the basis of the accused's
nationality, a prosecution may proceed in the country of nationality,
pursuant to domestic legislation, but until recently it was uncommon
for treaties to make this obligatory. The present model, however, does
just that. It provides that where extradition is refused on the ground of
nationality, the requested state shall, if the requesting state so requests,
submit the case to its competent authorities with a view to taking ap-
propriate action against the person.82
Extradition may be refused in a number of cases other than na-
tionality, including those ne bis in idem cases where the competent au-
thorities of the requested state have decided not to institute or to termi-
nate proceedings against the person for the offense in respect of which
extradition is requested,83 and where a prosecution in respect of the
offense for which extradition is requested is pending in the requested
state.8 Again, it may be refused if the offense carries the death penalty
81. Model Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 4(a). A recent commentator
notes:
Most civil law countries, as well as some common law countries, regard the
nonextradition of their citizens as an important principle deeply ingrained
in their legal traditions. They justify the principle on various grounds, in-
cluding the state's obligation to protect its citizens, lack of confidence in
the fairness of foreign judicial proceedings, the many disadvantages a de-
fendant confronts in trying to defend himself in a foreign state before a
strange legal system, as well as the additional disadvantages posed by im-
prisonment in a foreign jail where family and friends may be distant and
the chances of rehabilitation are significantly diminished.
Nadelman, supra note 32, at 67.
82. Model Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 4(a). Functionally, this provi-
sion in the model extradition treaty would work the same way as a request for the
transfer of proceedings to the state of nationality. See discussion of the Model Treaty
on Transfer of Proceedings, infra note 108. There is no magic to a provision requiring
this type of vicarious administration of justice in the face of lethargy by the other
treaty party. Note, for example, the discussion by Nadelman, supra note 32, at 70, of
relatively unsuccessful efforts by United States authorities to galvanize Mexican prose-
cutors into action. (Art. 9 of the Mexico-U.S. treaty has a mild prcsecution require-
ment. Where a national is not extradited "the requested Party shall submit the case to
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, provided that'Party has juris-
diction over the offense." Extradition Laws and Treaties, United States, No. 590.19, at
art. 9(2) (I. Kavass & A. Sprudzs comp. 1979). As a civil law country, Mexico is more
likely than the United States to have nationality-based legislation in place in a particu-
lar instance, but may not necessarily use it.
83. Model Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 4(b).
84. Id. at art. 4(c).
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under the law of the requesting state, unless that state gives such assur-
ance as the requested state considers sufficient that the death penalty
will not be imposed, or, if imposed, will not be carried out.8 5
The model contains standard machinery provisions8 and re-asserts
the "rule of specialty" under which a person surrendered under the
treaty shall not be proceeded against, sentenced, detained, re-extradited
to a third state, or subjected to any other restriction of liberty in the
territory of the requesting state for any offense committed before sur-
render, other than an offense for which extradition was granted, or any
other offense as to which the requested state consents.87
Finally, the model reiterates the current "non-solution" to the
problem of how to deal with concurrent requests from different coun-
tries for the same person, by providing that in such a situation a party
"shall, at its discretion, determine to which of those states the person is
to be extradited."881 The problem is becoming acute in the area of ter-
rorism, where multiple bases for jurisdiction may be asserted in respect
of the same incident but no clear priority is assigned. The problem also
may arise in situations where the accused is wanted in more than one
place for different offenses. General international law provides no guid-
ance about priorities in such cases and merely forces states to negotiate
in each instance. The draft recognizes this approach, with an acknowl-
edgement that the state having possession of the accused is in the ulti-
mate position of calling the shots if no agreement can be reached. 9
85. Id. at art. 4(d). A footnote adds that some countries may wish to apply the
same restriction to the imposition of a life, or indeterminate sentence - an interesting
commentary on evolving contemporary attitudes towards modes of punishment.
86. See id. at art. 5 on channels of communication and required documents; art.
7 on certification and authentication; art. 9 on provisional arrest; art. 11 on surrender
of the person; and art. 13 on surrender of property found in the requested state that has
been acquired as a result of the offense or that may be required as evidence.
87. Id. at art. 14.
88. Id. at art. 16.
89. Some attention was given to this problem at the Eighth United Nations Con-
gress in the context of the struggle against terrorism, although the only recommenda-
tion that emerged was that "U]urisdictional priorities should be established giving ter-
ritoriality the first priority." Report of the Eighth United Nations Congress, supra note
3, at 190, para. 7 (Resolution on terrorist criminal activities). The Commonwealth
Scheme, supra note 8, para. 13, provides some help in some cases (it seems more help
in cases of requests for different offenses arising out of distinct events rather than re-
quests in respect of the same incident). It requires the requested state to consider all
the circumstances, including (a) the relative seriousness of the offences, (b) the relative
dates on which the requests were made, and (c) the citizenship or other national status
1991]
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3. The Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters
The Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 0
has benefitted, like the model extradition treaty, from a great amount
of work done by the Australians who have been actively engaged in
negotiating such treaties.91 It also has some similarities to the Scheme
Relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters within the Com-
monwealth, first adopted in 1986.92 The basic aim of the model treaty
of the fugitive and his ordinary residence. The recent Australian treaties echo this lan-
guage. See, e.g., art. 9 of the treaty with the Netherlands in Aust. Stat. Rules 1988,
No. 293. Simply granting priority to the territorial state does not catch the full range
of considerations in respect of multiple extradition requests relating to the same inci-
dent, either in respect of international crimes or in respect of ordinary crimes. As a
commentary on the transfer of criminal proceedings noted:
The assumption that it is normally most appropriate to prosecute an of-
fence where it has been committed is not justified. Rehabilitation of the
offender, which is increasingly given weight in modem penal law, requires
that the sanction be imposed and enforced where the reformative aim can
be most successfully pursued. That is normally in the State where the of-
fender has family or social ties or will take up residence after the enforce-
ment of the sanction. On the other hand, it is clear that difficulties in se-
curing evidence will often be a consideration militating against the
transmission of proceedings from the State where the offence has been
committed to another State ...
European Committee on Crime Problems, Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on
the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters 15
(1970). Terrorism offenses may be different from other crimes because rehabilitation
considerations may not weigh heavily with ideological offenders.
90. Model Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 4.
91. By Apr. 3, 1990, Australia had recent Mutual Assistance treaties in force
with Canada, Japan, Switzerland, the U.S. and Vanuatu. Treaties were awaiting ratifi-
cation with Austria, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Portugal,
Spain and the United Kingdom (the last limited to drug trafficking offenses). Letter
from Herman Woltring, supra note 64. On recent United States practice, see Ellis &
Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters," in II
INT'L CRIM. LAW (PROCEDURE) 151 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1986); Nadelman, supra note
32, at 58. On the socialist countries' experience in the area, often as part of a larger
package of conventions "on legal co-operation in civil, family and criminal matters,"
see Gardocki, The Socialist System, in II INT'L CGlM. LAW (PROCEDURE), supra, at
133.
92. Scheme Relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Within the
Commonwealth, as amended in, 16 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1043 (1990). See Mc-
Clean, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters: The Commonwealth Initiative, 37
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 177 (1988).
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is that the parties shall afford each other the widest possible measure of
mutual assistance in investigations or court proceedings in respect of
offenses the punishment of which, at the time of the request for assis-
tance, falls within the jurisdiction of the judicial authorities of the re-
questing state.93
The types of assistance may include:
(a) taking of evidence or statements from persons;
(b) assisting in the availability of detained persons or others to
give evidence or assist in investigations;
(c) effecting service of judicial documents;
(d) executing searches and seizures;
(e) examining objects and sites;
(f) providing information and evidentiary items; and
(g) providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents
and records, including bank, financial, corporate or business records. 4
Mutual assistance is a somewhat limited concept, but of great
practical importance. The draft underscores the limitations by indicat-
ing areas to which "assistance" does not extend, although such areas
may be covered by other treaty obligations. Notably, the treaty is not a
mode of extradition; it does not require the enforcement in the re-
quested state of criminal judgments imposed in the requesting state;95
it does not deal with the transfer of persons in custody to serve
sentences; nor does it deal with the transfer of proceedings in criminal
matters.9 A mutual assistance treaty, in short, is useful in conjunction
with other treaty relationships that deal with associated aspects of the
general problem of cooperation.
States are required to designate competent authorities to process
requests,9 7 and the form for requests and modes of dealing with them
are set out.98 Assistance may be refused where the requested state "is
of the opinion that the request, if granted, would prejudice its sover-
eignty, security, public order (ordre public) or other essential public
interests."9 9 Assistance may also be refused on political offender and
human rights grounds which largely track the grounds for refusal
93. Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 4, at art. 1, para. 1.
94. Id. at art 1, para. 2.
95. Except as permitted by the law of the requested state and the optional proto-
col to the draft. See infra note 102.
96. Model Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 4, at art. 1, para. 3.
97. Id. at art. 3.
98. Id. at art. 5.
99. Id. at art. 4, para. l(a).
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under thie model extradition treaty."' 0
In one striking way, the model treaty differs from the Common-
wealth Scheme 0 1 on which in part it is based. The latter includes in its
standard list of modes of assistance "tracing, and forfeiting the pro-
ceeds of criminal activities," but nothing to this effect appears in the
United Nations model treaty itself. The matter is, however, singled out
for an "Optional Protocol to the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters Concerning the Proceeds of Crime.1 0 2 Parties to the
Protocol would agree that a requested state will endeavor to trace as-
sets, investigate financial dealings, and obtain other information or evi-
dence that may help secure the recovery of proceeds of crime.103 The
requested state must, to the extent permitted by its law, give effect to
or permit enforcement of a final order forfeiting or confiscating the pro-
ceeds of crime made by a court of the requesting state, or take other
appropriate action to secure the proceeds following a request.104
An explanatory note to the Protocol suggests that the Protocol is
included "on the ground that questions of forfeiture are conceptually
different from, although closely related to, matters generally accepted
as falling within the description of mutual assistance."10 5 It further
provides that states may wish to include such provisions because of
their significance in dealing with organized crime. Forfeiture seems to
be in vogue both in domestic law106 and in current bilateral 07 assis-
100. Id. at art. 4, paras. 1(b), (c); see also Model Extradition Treaty, supra note
63 and accompanying text.
101. Commonwealth, supra note 8.
102. Model Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 4. "Proceede; of crime" is de-
fined broadly as "any property suspected, or found by a court, to be property directly
or indirectly derived or realized as a result of the commission of an offence or to re-
present the value of property and other benefits derived from the commission of an
offence." Id. at para. 1.
103. Id., para. 3, at 95.
104. Id. at para. 5.
105. Optional Protocol, supra note 102 n. 90a.
106. See, e.g., Fisse, Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime: Funny Money, Serious
Legislation, 13 Cam. L.J. 368 (1989); Gilmore, supra note 80, at 399-90; McClean,
Seizing the Proceeds of Crime: The State of the Art, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 334
(1989).
107. As in some of the recent Australian treaties, see, e.g., Treaty Between Aus-
tralia and the Republic of the Philippines on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
Apr, 28, 1988, art. 1, para. 3(e) and art. 18 (on file with the author); Treaty between
Australia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters, Oct. 28, 1988, art. 1, para. 2(h) and art. 18 (on file with the author). It also
appears in dramatic detail in one recent multilateral treaty, the December 1988 United
[Vol. 15492
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tance practice, so it is not surprising that some effort is made to deal
with it here.
4. The Model Treaty on the Transfer of Proceedings in Crimi-
nal Matters
The Model Treaty on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal
Matters08 proceeds on the basis that when a person is suspected of
having committed an offense under the law of a state which is party to
the treaty, that state may, if the interests of the proper administration
of justice so. require, request another state which is a party to take
proceedings in respect of the offense.' 0 9 For the purposes of the Treaty,
a request provides the requested state with the necessary jurisdiction in
respect of the offense if that state does not already have jurisdiction
under its own law. Indeed, the Treaty obligates the parties to take the
necessary legislative measures to ensure that a request to take proceed-
ings shall allow the requested state to exercise the necessary jurisdic-
tion."10 This kind of jurisdiction is referred to, particularly in European
usage, as "vicarious administration of justice.""' One suspects that the
most likely field of application for such a treaty is where an accused
has returned to his or her state of nationality and an extradition re-
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/15 (1988). Article 5 of that Convention has fairly
strong provisions requiring legislative, judicial and administrative action to effect
confiscations.
108. Model Transfer of Proceedings Treaty, supra note 5. According to the Re-
port of the Experts who met in Baden in 1987 to work on the draft of this model:
The model agreement on transfer of proceedings ... could contribute to a
reduction of pre-trial detention and to the solution of problems of concur-
rent jurisdictions and plurality of proceedings which laid an additional
burden on national criminal justice systems and caused unnecessary hard-
ship for offenders. This model agreement might eventually lead to the re-
ciprocal formal acknowledgement of the validity of foreign criminal judge-
ments and, thus, may constitute significant progress towards the further
establishment of international recognition of the principle of double jeop-
ardy (ne bis in idem).
Report of the International Expert Meeting on United Nations and Law Enforcement,
Baden near Vienna, Nov. 16-19, 1987, at 63 (hereinafter Baden Report).
109. Model Transfer of Proceedings Treaty, supra note 5, at art. 1, para. 1.
110. Id. at art. 1, para. 2.
111. For a good introduction to theory and practice in the area, see Meyer, The
Vicarious Administration of Justice: An Overlooked Basis of Jurisdiction, 31 HARv.
INT'L L. J. 108 (1990).
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quest is futile since that state does not extradite nationals. 12 It is not,
however, intended that the treaty should be limited to such cases and it
is also meant to encompass situations where the requested state would
not be in a position to effect the extradition of a national of a third
state. Selling this treaty to common law countries is somewhat difficult
since they do not usually exercise jurisdiction over what their nationals
do abroad, yet that idea is not altogether unprecedented. 11 3
As in the other models, the parties are to designate channels of
communication;11 4 certain documents are required;115 and various for-
malities are spelled out.110 Dual criminality is required.117 Various
grounds of refusal are given: l that the suspected person is not a na-
tional of or ordinarily resident in the requested state; that the act is an
offense under military law which is not also an offense under ordinary
criminal law; that the offense is in connection with taxes, duties, cus-
toms or exchange; that the offense is regarded by the requested state as
being of a political nature.
The suspected person is entitled to express to either state his or her
112. For a good discussion of the situations in which transfer treaties are useful
and on the genre in general, see Schutte, The European System, in II INT'L CRIM.
LAW (PROCEDURE), supra note 91, at 319. As was noted earlier in the discussion of
extradition, supra note 3 and accompanying text, there may be a case based on the
rehabilitation of the offender for trial and subsequent punishment in his or her country
of origin. If the states in question have an extradition treaty with the provision for the
prosecution of non-extraditable nationals discussed supra, then the present treaty
would be redundant in the particular cases suggested in the text but may be useful in
other instances. Moreover, transfer of custodial or non-custodial punishment to the
state of origin after conviction may serve the same ultimate purpose as transfer of
proceedings. Thus, the various forms of cooperation treaties discussed may often be
alternative routes to the same end.
113. Note, for example, New Zealand's exercise of jurisdiction over diplomats
who commit offenses abroad but who are immune from local jurisdiction at the place of
commission. Crimes Act (New Zealand) 1961, Section 8A, as substituted by Section
14 (1) of the External Relations Act 1988. A number of British Cormonwealth coun-
tries (anomalously) exercise jurisdiction over bigamy committed abroad by nationals
but not over more serious offenses such as murder. See, e.g., R. v. Lander, [1919]
N.Z.L.R. 305 (C.A.) (the "constitutionality" of such legislation, if not its wisdom, was
conceded by the 1930s).
114. Model Transfer of Proceedings Treaty, supra note 5, at art. 2.
115. Id. at art. 3.
116. Id. at arts. 3-5.
117. Id. at art. 6.
118. Id. at art 7.
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interest in the transfer of proceedings," 9 although the factors to be
taken into account in deciding whether to give effect to those views are
not articulated. Both states are required to ensure that the rights of the
victim, in particular the victim's right to restitution or compensation,
shall not be affected by the transfer.120 The suspect's right not to be
prosecuted twice is protected. 21 A framework for dealing with multiple
prosecution possibilities 22 is also suggested by language asserting that
where criminal proceedings are pending in two or more states against
the same suspected person in respect of the same offense, the states
concerned shall conduct consultations to decide which of them alone
should continue the proceedings. An agreement reached thereupon
shall have the consequences of a request for transfer of proceedings. 123
5. The Model Treaty on the Transfer of Supervision of Ofend-
ers Conditionally Sentenced or Conditionally Released
The fourth of the 1990 models is the Model Treaty on the Trans-
fer of Supervision of Offenders Conditionally Sentenced or Condition-
ally Released. 24 It follows up from the 1985 model on persons sen-
tenced to imprisonment. It applies to a person who has been found
guilty and (a) placed on probation without sentence having been pro-
nounced, (b) given a suspended sentence involving deprivation of lib-
erty, or (c) given a sentence, the enforcement of which has been modi-
fied (parole) or conditionally suspended, in whole or in part, either at
the time of the sentence or subsequently. 25 The sentencing state may
request another party to the treaty ("the administering state") to take
responsibility for applying the terms of the decision.' 2 The rationale
for the scheme is, as in other instances, found in the preamble to the
119. Id. at art. 8.
120. Id. at art. 9.
121. Id. at axt. 10.
122. Id. at art 13.
123. Id.
124. Model Transfer of Supervision Treaty, supra note 6. According to the Ex-
perts who met in Baden in 1987 to work on the draft of this and other instruments, the
model "could contribute to a reduction in the numbers of persons required to serve
prison sentences and to the social resettlement of foreign offenders by avoiding impris-
onment through the increased application of supervision alternatives.", Baden Report,
supra note 108, at 63.
125. Model Transfer of Supervision Treaty, supra note 6, at art.1, para. 1.
126. Id. at art 1, para. 2.
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draft. It argues that such transfers should further the ends of justice,
encourage the use of alternatives to imprisonment, facilitate the social
resettlement of sentenced persons and further the interests of victims of
crime.127 The draft contains similar grounds for refusal to those con-
tained in the Treaty on the Transfer of Proceedings.1 2 The sentenced
person is entitled to express his or her views on the transfer 129 and the
rights of the victim, especially to restitution or compensation, must not
be adversely affected as a result of the transfer.130
The acceptance by the administering state of the responsibility for
applying the sentence extinguishes the competence of the sentencing
state to enforce the sentence.13 1 The supervision is to be carried out in
accordance with the law of the administering state. That state alone
has the right of revocation. The administering state may, to the extent
necessary, adapt to its own law the conditions or measures prescribed,
provided that such conditions or measures are, in terms of their nature
or duration, not more severe than those pronounced in the sentencing
state.3 2 The sentencing state alone shall have the right to decide on
any application to reopen the case.133 Either party, however, may grant
pardon, amnesty or commutation of the sentence in accordance with
the provisions of its Constitution or other laws. 3
6. The Model Treaty for the Prevention of Crimes that In-
fringe on the Cultural Heritage of Peoples in the Form of
Movable Property
The last of the 1990 models is the Model Treaty :"or the Preven-
tion of Crimes that Infringe on the Cultural Heritage of Peoples in the
Form of Movable Property.3 5 "Movable cultural property" is defined
127. Id. at Preamble, para. 5.
128. Id. at art. 7.
129. Id. at art. 8.
130. Id. at art. 9.
131. Id. at art. 10.
132. Id. at art. 11, para. 1.
133. Id. at art. 12, para. 14
134. Id. at art. 12, para. 2.
135. Model Cultural Heritage Treaty, supra note 7. This model was the most
controversial of the drafts considered at the Eighth Congress. It had not received the
careful consideration of members of the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control
(the preparatory body for the Congress) that the other drafts had received. It was
revised by a drafting group of experts in Chicago in June of 1990 and the revised
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for the purposes of the treaty as referring to property which, on reli-
gious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by a state party as
being subject to export control by reason of its importance for archaeol-
ogy, prehistory, history, literature, art or science, and as belonging to
one or more of a lengthy list of categories. 138 Each state party
undertakes:
(a) To take the necessary measures to prohibit the import of mova-
ble cultural property (i) which has been stolen in the other State
Party or (ii) which has been illicitly exported from the other State
Party;
(b) To take the necessary measures to prohibit the acquisition of,
and dealing within its territory with, movable cultural property
which has been imported contrary to the prohibitions resulting
from the implementation of subparagraph (a) above;
(c) To legislate in order to prevent persons and institutions within
its territory from entering into international conspiracies with re-
spect to movable cultural property;
(d) To provide information concerning its stolen movable cultural
property to an international data base agreed upon between the
States Parties; 37
(e) To take the measures necessary to ensure that the purchaser of
stolen movable property which is listed on the international data
base is not considered to be a purchaser who has acquired such
property in good faith;
(f) To introduce a system whereby the export of movable cultural
property is authorized by the issue of an export certificate;
(g) To take the measures necessary to ensure that a purchaser of
imported movable cultural property which is not accompanied by
version did not become available until the Congress in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/L.2
dated 28 August 1990. Consequently some delegates would have preferred to put more
work into it, for reasons of professional pride. The subject-matter is, moreover, of con-
siderable political significance, especially between developed countries with large collec-
tions of precious objects from elsewhere and developing countries which would like
them back. As a model, it is, of course, not cast in stone.
136. Id. at art. 1, para. 1. The list includes rare collections and specimens of
fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and objects of paleontological interest; products of
archaeological excavations or discoveries; pictures, paintings and drawings; and rare
manuscripts and incunabula.
137. A footnote to the draft text at this point suggests that there should be fur-
ther development of the data base approach. For a concrete suggestion along these
lines, see Government of Canada, Proposal for the International Exchange of Informa-
tion to Combat Crimes Against Cultural Movable Property (1990).
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an export certificate issued by the other State Party and who did
not acquire the movable cultural property prior to the entry into
force of this treaty shall not be considered to be a person who has
acquired the movable cultural property in good faith;
(h) To use all the means at its disposal, including the fostering of
public awareness, to combat the illicit import and export, theft, il-
licit excavation and illicit dealing in movable cultural property. 38
Each party, further, promises to take the necessary measures to
recover and return, at the request of another State Party, any movable
cultural property covered by the treaty.13 9 To emphasize the criminal
law nature of the treaty, Article 3, headed "Sanctions," requires each
party to impose sanctions upon (a) persons or institutions responsible
for the illicit import or export of movable cultural property, (b) persons
or institutions that knowingly acquire or deal in stolen or illicitly im-
ported movable cultural property and (c) persons or institutions that
enter into international conspiracies to obtain, export or import mova-
ble cultural property by illicit means. 140
Article 4 of the Model Treaty covers procedures to be followed.
Requests for recovery and return are to be made through diplomatic
channels, with supporting documentation.' 4' Expenses incidental to the
return of the property are to be borne by the requesting State Party
and no person or institution shall be entitled to claim any form of com-
pensation from the State Party returning the property claimed. Neither
shall the requesting State Party be required to compensate in any way
such persons or institutions as may have participated irt illegally send-
ing abroad the property in question, although it must pay fair compen-
sation to any person or institution that in good faith acquired or was in
legal possession of the property.' 42 The States Parties agree to make
138. Model Cultural Heritage Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 2, para. 1 (footnotes
omitted).
139. Id. at art. 2, para. 2.
140. Id. at art. 3. n. 122 at this point in the text makes the rather obvious point
in the circumstances that "States Parties should consider adding certain types of of-
fences against movable cultural property to the list of extraditable offences covered by
an extradition treaty." The present model is not an extradition treaty but is intended as
part of a package of relationships, and the other parts of the package need to be
dovetailed.
141. Id. at art. 4, para. 1.
142. Id. at art. 4, para. 2 n. 124 at this point in the text suggests that "State
Parties may wish to consider whether the expenses and/or the expense of providing
compensation should be shared between them"; n.125 suggests that "States Parties
[Vol. 15
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available to each other such information as will assist in combating
crimes against cultural movable property.1 43 Each party is, moreover,
to provide information concerning laws which protect its movable cul-
tural property to an international data base agreed upon between the
States Parties.1 "
III. CONCLUSION
So there is the package of model treaties. Given that many states
need to do a lot of work on their basic extradition law and treaties, it is
not all that likely that the more sophisticated models will command
widespread acceptance in the near future. But the Congresses and their
follow up within the United Nations represents an important opportu-
nity to spread among criminal justice professionals - the basic constit-
uency of the United Nations Congresses - further knowledge of the
range of co-operative opportunities suggested by modern state practice.
It was appreciated that there was no great likelihood that such
issues would be solved in a multilateral fashion (except perhaps among
regional, or other like-minded groupings)14 5 and that the emphasis
should, accordingly, be on suggesting to states the framework upon
which their negotiators might proceed, but leaving them to tailor-make
the final details. I suggest that this is a useful enterprise in which to be
engaged.146 One should not underestimate the paucity of resources in
many a Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Justice when it
may wish to consider the position of a blameless possessor who has inherited or other-
wise gratuitously acquired a cultural object which had been previously dealt with in
bad faith."
143. Id. at art. 4, para. 3
144. Id. at art. 4, para. 4.
145. Thus, as was noted supra, the documents are drafted primarily on the as-
sumption that they will be used for bilaterals, but they are readily adaptable to wider -
notably regional - use. The models, indeed, owe much to treaties developed in the Euro-
pean region. The limited ratification that has occurred there, however, suggests that
these are areas where much education is required before states are actually going to do
the nitty gritty work to bring the treaties into force. See Muller-Rappard, The Euro-
pean System, in II INT'L C iM. LAw (PROCEDURE), supra note 91, at 96.
146. According to a report prepared by the Secretary-General for the Eighth
Congress, 17 of 49 states which replied to a questionnaire item on the subject reported
that they were using the Model Agreement on the Transfer of Foreign Prisoners for
bilateral negotiations. Implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treat-
ment of Prisoners, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/11, at 7 (1990)(Report of the Secretary-
General).
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comes to acting on the international plane and the documents are
meant to be helpful in such eases.
Ultimately, however, there is no escaping the hard work involved
in the network of individual exercises in diplomacy that are necessary
to put the edifice of cooperation in place.
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